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Your Place in Space: 
Classroom Experiment on Spatial Location Theory 
Margo Bergman, G. Dirk Mateer, Michael Reksulak, Jonathan C. Rork, Rick K. Wilson 
and David Zirkle 
 
Abstract 
 
The authors detail an urban economics experiment that is easily run in the classroom. The 
experiment has a flexible design that allows the instructor to explore how congestion, 
zoning, public transportation, and taxation levels determine the bid-rent function. 
Heterogeneous agents in the experiment compete for land use utilizing a simple auction 
mechanism. Using the data that is collected, a bid-rent function is derived, and the 
experimental treatment is altered over the course of three sessions to uncover core 
concepts in urban economics. Moreover, this provides a tangible experience that can be 
used to help undergraduates relate to urban issues such as the steep rent gradient found 
around many larger colleges and universities.  
 
JEL codes: A22, R1, C9 
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This classroom experiment is versatile in that it can be applied to many different 
economic scenarios.  In our discussion we focus on an urban application: that of 
differential locational demand patterns by heterogeneous agents.  When teaching urban 
economics it is sometimes difficult for students to understand spatial location models.  
Such models are standard for motivating the analysis of urban settings, transportation, 
and competing taxing authorities.  The exercise that follows has three goals.  The first is 
to demonstrate that competitive forces determine the spatial locations of individual 
citizens and businesses in an urban area.  Second, it allows the instructor to demonstrate 
how other key issues, such as zoning, transportation networks, and differential tax rates, 
affect the spatial calculus of different actors in the community.  Third, students gain first-
hand experience at how each of these separate market forces helps to determine where 
businesses and residences locate. 
Instructors seeking to motivate how spatial markets work can introduce off-
campus apartment rentals surrounding their institution.  In many cases, there exists a 
steep rent gradient within walking distance of the college or university.  Introductory 
courses in economics can benefit from using this exercise to stimulate a more complete 
comprehension of how agents make optimal decisions given constraints.  The exercise 
presents a public economics application of the Tiebout mechanism (Tiebout 1956).  
Different treatments can be easily constructed to demonstrate how residents relocate – 
“vote with their feet” – when municipalities offer more attractive services or 
comparatively low tax rates.  
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MOTIVATION 
 
The bid-rent function is a core concept in urban economic analysis.  Its origins 
can be found in the analysis of land use by the German economist J. H. von Thünen (von 
Thünen 1826), which relied heavily upon Ricardo’s (1817 [1951]) theory of rent. In his 
groundbreaking article on the urban land market, Alonso (1964) pointed out that a 
purchaser acquires two goods (land and location) in one transaction.  Therefore, it is 
possible to trade off a quantity of land against location.  The Alonso monocentric model 
is applicable to economic activities that display a hierarchy of use in terms of distance 
from the center.  
The cornerstone of the bid-rent function is the leftover principle, which is the 
notion that under perfect competition, all nonland profits accrue to the landowner.  
Because transportation costs associated with undertaking market transactions vary with 
each location, the amount an economic agent is willing to pay for a particular location 
will vary negatively with distance, as predicted by Alonso.  Each agent has its own bid-
rent function and competes for land with other agents.  The assumption of perfect 
competition guarantees that agents will bid away their nonland profits at each location, 
resulting in rents (profits) for the landowner.  The use (or activity) that has the highest 
bid-rent at one point is theoretically the use that will occupy a particular location. 
In developing a bid-rent function there are three elements that must be 
determined.  First, there is the issue of the rent (profit) that results from some advantage 
associated with the property.  In the case of a business it can be accessibility to suppliers.  
For residential property it can be distance to the city center or the available amenities. 
Second, the rent gradient must be determined. Its steepness is determined by the marginal 
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cost of distance for each activity (often embodied as transportation costs) and the friction 
of space.  If there were no frictional issues, each location would be a perfect location.  
Segregation of land occurs by type, caused by differences in endowments and 
transportation costs.  Third, the combinations of land prices and distances among which 
the individual (or firm) is indifferent, known as the bid-rent function, is fixed.  
Households typically have a bid-rent function for urban land that is flatter than the bid-
rent line for manufacturers so it is not surprising to find households farther from the city 
center. 
Creating an individual bid-rent function is relatively straightforward for students.  
This experiment aids in understanding the dynamic movements of bid-rent functions that 
occur with changes in endowments, transportation costs, and other economic factors.  
When combined into a multiple bid-rent function arena, the class experiment 
demonstrates that segregated land use can quickly result.  We often find that students fail 
to grasp the notion that land use can be segregated, or are unwilling to believe that this 
could be the case. 
In most urban settings, the interaction of multiple bid-rent functions is a general 
equilibrium problem.  Many variables are at work and identifying a set of land 
price/distance locations among which agents are indifferent requires students to think 
simultaneously on many different levels.  The advantage of this classroom experiment is 
that one factor can be isolated and students can observe how this affects the bid-rent 
function. 
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INSTRUCTOR PROCEDURES 
 
The exercise can be run with any size class in approximately 30 minutes.  It is 
designed to be run with small classes (n < 30), although with large classes it would be 
possible to partition the class into groups of 30 or less and run the exercise 
simultaneously in each group.  The goals of the class experiment are to introduce students 
to spatial location models, to get students to think about tradeoffs between price and 
relative cost and to illustrate that segregation of land use occurs by type, because of 
differences in endowments and transportation costs. 
The exercise proceeds through three distinct treatments, with each treatment 
taking approximately 10 minutes to complete.  The entire exercise can be carried out by a 
single person although it is helpful to have a second person record the data into a 
spreadsheet so that the results are available for analysis upon completion of the exercise. 
 
Materials 
 
In order to conduct this experiment you will need: 
• Decks of cards (ace through 10), greater than or equal to the numbers of students 
in the class. 
• Red and black poker chips (or some other, easily distributed and hidden marker) 
in equal numbers, enough for everyone in the class to receive one chip. 
• Opaque container. 
• A payoff sheet for each student (there are two types of payoff sheets). 
• A recording sheet. 
• An instruction sheet. 
Copies of the various instruction and payoff sheets are provided in the Appendix. 
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Pre-Experiment Preparations 
All of the preparations can be handled beforehand.  All that is needed is: 
• A spreadsheet or some other device to generate bid-rent functions. 
• Oral instructions to be read by the experimenter (see the Appendix). 
• An overhead projector for the student instructions or enough individual sheets 
with the printed student instructions (see the Appendix). 
• Copies of the student record sheets. 
• A spreadsheet or other method to store the data generated. 
 
Experiment Instructions 
 
The following steps are taken to run the experiment.  Throughout, we assume that an 
overhead projector is used, but similar sequences can be used for materials that are 
passed out by hand. 
1. A short set of instructions are read (see the Experimenter’s Instructions in the 
Appendix).  These provide minimal information to the students but give them an 
overview to the experiment.  Students should be told enough information so that 
they can participate in an informed manner without giving them all the details. 
2. The chips should be placed in an opaque container, and students should take them 
one at a time.  Students who receive a RED chip are in Group A; students 
receiving a BLACK chip are in group B.  The chips are to be kept hidden from 
other students, so that the exact number of each type is not obvious.  Chips are 
used in order to reduce possible confusion between the “type” card, which tells 
the student which type they are, and the “unit” card which is the card they are 
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purchasing.  As they draw a chip, distribute the appropriate subject instructions to 
each person.  
3.  Give each student a couple of minutes to review the subject instruction sheet and 
work through the example so that they know how to calculate their profits. 
If, in period 1, a subject purchases a card with a value of 4 for a price of 20, then 
their record sheet would look like that given in Table 1.  Total costs are calculated 
by multiplying the value on the card bought, 4, by the cost per unit, 20.  Add to 
this the price of the card, 20, to get a total cost of 100.  Subtract 100 from their 
endowment of 120, and the result is earnings of 20. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Once everyone understands the process, there are three primary points that need 
to be repeated:  The first is that everyone can only buy once in each period.  The 
second is that participants should attempt to generate the largest rent possible. If 
you do not bid during a period then your earnings for that period are zero.  Third, 
participants who over-bid lose the amount that they overbid in that round from 
their total profits.  These simple rules are designed to keep the experiment flowing 
and to minimize distractions.  In order to maintain interest, incentives should be 
used.  Something as simple as distributing candy for students with the highest 
profit at the end of the class is an option if there does not already exist a monetary 
or grade-based incentive structure. 
5. The experiment begins by showing students the reduced deck of cards that ranges 
from ace through 10.  Re-iterate to the students that a limited number of draws 
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will be made from this stack.  Each card represents a commodity and they will bid 
on these one at a time.  To get students to participate, randomly select one student 
to draw from the deck.  The total number of cards chosen in each period should be 
large enough to engage interest, but not so large that it takes too much time to get 
through each session.  Having 20-30 percent of the total number of cards become 
available in each round is sufficient.  In a class of 30, this would be between 6 and 
9 cards. 
6. Participants are now asked to bid.  Participants are reminded that they can only 
bid once in each period. An ascending oral (English) auction is then used to solicit 
bids.  The auctioneer begins and bids are accepted for each card. Once all the 
cards are exhausted in that period the results from that round are recorded and the 
next period begins.  The auctioneer should move the exercise along quickly and 
force students to make fast decisions.  
7. All bids and winnings are recorded.  
8. Treatment 2 begins.  In treatment 2, a fee is placed on purchases made by type B 
subjects.  The endowments and costs per unit for all subjects remain the same for 
both type A and type B.  Each subject retains their original type and instruction 
sheet.   This new fee is already written into the record sheet for all type B’s. 
Briefly go over the changes so that everyone understands that the financial 
calculus is different. Repeat steps 4, 5, 6, and 7.  Table 2 provides an example of 
the earnings record sheet with the new fee. Given the example from the 
instructions for treatment 1, a subject who purchased a 4 card for a price of 20, 
would now have a total cost of 120, resulting in earnings of 0. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
9. Treatment 3 begins. In treatment 3, the cost per unit for type A’s is lowered.  The 
endowments and costs per unit for all subjects remain the same for type B.  The 
extra fee from treatment B is removed.  The type B’s return to their original costs.  
This is indicated on their information sheet.  Each subject retains their original 
type and instruction sheet.   This new per unit cost is already written into the 
record sheet for all type A’s.  Briefly go over the changes so that everyone 
understands that the financial calculus is different.  Repeat steps 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
10. After treatment 3 ends the students should tally their winnings. 
What to Expect 
The bid-rent functions for each treatment are generated from the endowment and per 
unit transportation cost (fixed cost).  There are two types of consumers, type A with a 
smaller endowment, but a lower per unit transportation fixed cost, and type B, with a 
larger endowment, and a higher per unit transportation fixed cost.  In order to generate 
the basic equilibrium bid-rent function, use the following formula: 
(1) i i iBR E t D= − , 
where BRi is the bid-rent function for either type A or type B. Ei is the endowment for that 
type, ti is each type’s fixed per unit transportation cost and D is the distance from the city 
center.  The bid-rent functions of the various treatments can be found by altering either 
the transportation cost, as in the example treatment 3, or by adding a tax or subsidy, as in 
treatment 2, which is effectively a reduction or increase in the endowment, respectively. 
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Once both bid-rent functions are generated, they can be plotted on the same graph 
in order to generate the intersection point.  The theory states that, all else equal, the type 
with a higher transportation cost should locate to the left of the intersection, and the other 
type will locate to the right.  Table 3 provides an example. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Given two types, Group B with an endowment of 120 and transportation cost of 20, and 
Group A with an endowment of 80 and a transportation cost of 10, the following bid rent 
functions are generated in Figure 1.  The point of intersection is 4, indicating that the A’s 
should locate from 5 to 8, and the B’s should locate from 1 to 3, and both are indifferent 
at 4. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
On the data record sheet the student should record the type of the buyer of a card, 
the number of the card that they bought, the price they paid, and the maximum price they 
should have paid, based on their endowment and transportation cost.  In order to compare 
the experimental data to the theoretical outcome, plot the price paid vs. the two maximum 
prices at each location.  It should show that the buyers to the left of the intersection point 
are the type with a higher transportation cost. 
 
RESULTS 
 
To motivate a robust class discussion it is easy to generate real-time data from the 
experiment you have just completed.  This provides a platform for a discussion of spatial 
location models.  The students should now understand that changes in endowments and 
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costs will affect where agents locate.  As part of the lesson it is straightforward to explain 
how the bid-rent functions were created and illustrate the corresponding bids from the 
exercise. 
Below we include the results from experiments run during the 2005-2006 
academic year.  The experiments were conducted with both Principles and Intermediate 
Microeconomics students at two universities: Georgia Southern University and 
Pennsylvania State University. 
 Figure 2 plots the prices paid under the no fee treatment, while the two lines 
indicate the bid-rent function for each type at that location. There were 126 data points in 
each treatment (18 points in each of 7 sessions).  On visual inspection, the subjects in the 
first treatment often overpaid for the cards that they were purchasing, because many of 
the data points are above and to the right of the Nash equilibrium lines.  In our 
experience, students initially get caught up in the rush of participating in the auction, 
leading them to overbid without properly calculating and/or forgetting what their bid 
should be.  As the auction progresses, students relax and perform closer to theoretical 
predictions.1 Note that as the theory predicts, there were 3 cards not purchased at values 
8, 9 and 10.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In the second treatment, the type B’s paid an additional fee. Theoretically, this shifts the 
intersection point to the left compared with the data from treatment 1 plotted on Figure 2.  
                                                 
1 Overbidding often happens in the beginning, as students acquaint themselves with the experiment.  As our 
results demonstrate, students approach the theoretical outcomes as their experience in the experiment 
increases.  Such an occurrence opens the door for the instructor to have a discussion about the importance 
of rationality of agents for the predictions of not only this particular model, but also many other economic 
models that we teach.  
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From the data plotted on Figure 3, subjects shift in their price and outcomes converge to 
the Nash equilibrium.  There were 5 cards that were not purchased as predicted by the 
theory; again at values 8, 9, and 10. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In the third treatment, the per unit cost for type A’s is lowered and this rotates the 
type A bid-rent function outward.  Compared with treatment 1 this shifts the intersection 
point to the left and affects the point at which the type A curve intersects the location 
axis.  In this case, it shifts it far enough that all of the locations can be purchased by both 
types of players.  Figure 4 shows that subjects cluster around the Nash Equilibrium, often 
choosing to underpay rather than bid over the optimal purchase price. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
CLASS DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS 
 
From this experiment students should be able to see that in a spatial setting land 
use will be segregated by type.  This segregation is a result of two factors: endowments 
and transportation costs.  Finally, this exercise can demonstrate how to take a 
multivariate function and simplify it into a two-dimensional graph. 
One goal for this classroom experiment is to get students to appreciate how 
changes in one of the factors alter the bid-rent function.  The fee in treatment 2 has the 
effect of lowering the endowment of type B’s, but has no impact on the transportation 
costs type B’s face.  Consequently, the bid-rent function undergoes a parallel shift, as the 
agent is now able to afford less at all locations.  This helps students to see that 
endowment changes cause shifts in the bid-rent function. 
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Treatment 3 is designed to show that changes in transportation costs cause a 
rotation in the bid-rent function.  An important concept to emphasize is that changes in 
transportation costs only affect type A’s if they locate outside the city center.  Because no 
transportation costs are incurred in the city center, there is no change in what type A’s are 
willing to bid for that location.  Thus, lowering the transportation cost of type A’s 
resulted in an outward rotation in the bid-rent function. 
Treatments 2 and 3 also demonstrate to students how changes in one bid-rent 
function affect the land available to both types.  By imposing a tax on type B’s, type A’s 
were able to expand the land available to them at the expense of type B.  By lowering the 
transportation costs of type A’s, they were able to buy land that was previously too far 
away.  But at the same time, the transportation savings allowed type A’s to bid more 
competitively against the B’s, resulting in a smaller range of B-exclusive land. 
Once students learn the basic mechanics of the bid-rent function, there are many 
related discussions that can take place.  For example, it is useful to have students think of 
type A’s as residents and type B’s as firms.  Students can discuss why firms would have 
higher transportation costs than individuals.  Do they normally see firms in the city 
center?  Is this why?  This gives a nice segue for discussing the notion of a monocentric 
city and the creation of central business districts and residential pockets. 
In the same vein, one can ask what would happen if public transportation were 
expanded?  Students could respond that this would lower resident’s transportation costs, 
resulting in an outwards rotation of the bid-rent function and an expansion of the area 
where people are willing to live.  This can lead to a discussion about the expansion of the 
suburbs and the willingness of individuals to increase commuting time. 
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This in turn can be linked to what happens when congestion results from too 
many people moving into the suburbs.  Can this cause people to move back towards the 
center?  What effect would they have on land patterns?  Are people willing to pay more 
for land inside the tolls?  Even tangential questions about the efficacy of tolls on 
congestion could be discussed.   
Another extension is to bring in the notion of zoning.  Suppose in treatment 3 an 
urban growth boundary was placed at position 7.  What effect does this have?  Students 
will see that no one will locate beyond 7, but there will be no effect on the price of land 
within the boundary, as the leftover principle has already bid the price up to its 
maximum. 
Alternatively, one could impose a simple form of nuisance zoning in Treatment 1 
by banning B’s from buying locations 2 and 3.  Students should recognize that there 
would be a discontinuity in overall pricing, as only A’s would bid for these positions.  
However, B’s would be the exclusive purchasers of positions 1 and 4.  Moreover, we now 
have a distribution of land in which there are two pockets of B’s and two pockets of A’s. 
Once students see that land segregation can occur in pockets, as opposed to just 
two broad areas, a discussion about multicentric models (Ogawa and Fujita 1980; Bogart 
1998) can be initiated.  Students may be asked if there are any other rationales for why 
type B’s may not bid for particular areas, leading to conversations about interstates, 
airports and the general importance of transportation systems. 
The value of the bid-rent function is that once understood, it allows for numerous 
policy discussions.  Most importantly, the policy issues are often interrelated, so that 
discussions of the growth of the suburbs, congestion, and transportation can all be 
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brought together in one setting.  Such policy linkages allow students to think outside the 
box and see how one policy cannot be viewed in isolation.  Confronting and appreciating 
these general equilibrium effects in action is particularly enlightening for students. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This experiment demonstrates how competitive forces drive the spatial locations 
of individual citizens and businesses in an urban setting. Moreover, it provides a platform 
that the instructor can use to extend the understanding of spatial location theory and the 
location of rents in a monocentric model. The treatments described are designed to 
enhance student understanding of the factors that influence locational decisions.  
The simplicity of the bid-rent function and the monocentric city model is that it 
opens itself for discussion in various aspects of public policy.  Although the primary 
focus for such a model is in an urban economics class, the fact that this experiment is 
self-contained means that is well-suited for use in courses on urban and public policy that 
have little or no formal economic components to them. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Experimenter Instructions 
 
<Read before passing out the materials> 
 
In this experiment you will be purchasing cards.  You will always be a buyer.  You are 
not buying the cards from me, I am the auctioneer.  You need to pay careful attention to 
what is happening in the experiment. 
 
You are trying to maximize the difference between how much you pay for a card, the 
additional cost per unit of that card, and the endowment that you have. 
 
Each card is numbered A (which is a 1) through 10.  The number on the card represents 
how many “units” that card contains.  You are required to pay an additional amount per 
unit, on top of what you pay for the card itself. 
 
There are ___ number of cards total, but only ___ of them become available in each 
period. (Replace “blanks” with numbers.) 
 
You purchase these cards in an oral auction, where the highest bidder wins that card. 
 
I will be coming around, and you will pick a checker out of this container.  Half the 
checkers are black, and half are red.  Following this I will pass out the record sheets for 
the experiment. Please keep the color of your checker confidential. 
 
<Read once the materials have been passed out> 
 
You have received your record sheet.  Please keep your record sheet confidential 
throughout the experiment. 
 
The experiment will be conducted as follows: 
 
A card will be drawn from the deck of randomly shuffled cards here.  This is one of the 
___ number of cards that will become available for purchase in that period. 
 
The auctioneer will announce the value of the card, and that bidding is open at a certain 
value. 
 
If you wish to buy the card, raise your hand, and when called on, announce your bid.  
This will continue until no more people wish to bid, and the auctioneer will announce that 
bidding is over. 
 
Whoever wins the card will write down on their record sheet the unit value of the card, 
and the amount they paid.  Once you buy a card in a particular period you cannot buy 
another.  If you do, you will be disqualified from the rest of the experiment.   
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This will continue for all the cards that will be sold in a particular round. 
 
You calculate your earnings by taking the amount you have, minus the price you paid, 
minus the value of the card you purchased times the price per unit listed on your record 
sheet.  If there is an additional fee listed, you must add this to your purchase price when 
you calculate your earnings.  Make sure you are putting this information under the 
section entitled Session 1. Does anyone have any questions? 
 
Once the experiment is done, you will hand in your completed Record Sheet. 
 
Additional rules and examples are on the Subject Instruction handout. 
 
<Read for the second treatment.> 
 
Now we will begin the second session.  The mechanism will be the same, but you should 
refer to your information sheet to determine if your endowment or price per unit has 
changed, or if there is an additional fee. 
 
If there is an additional fee, you must add this to your purchase price when you calculate 
your earnings.  
 
Make sure you are recording information under the section entitled Session 2. 
 
 
<Read for the third treatment.> 
 
Now we will begin the third session.  The mechanism will be the same, but you should 
refer to your information sheet to determine if your endowment or price per unit has 
changed, or if there is an additional fee.  
 
If there is an additional fee, you must add this to your purchase price when you calculate 
your earnings.  
 
Make sure you are recording information under the section entitled Session 3. 
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Subject Instructions/Payoff Sheets. 
You are in Group A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. You are going to be asked to make 
choices. Your choices will determine your pay-offs in this game. 
 
There are two groups of buyers in this game; those in Group A and those in Group B. 
Your Endowment and Cost are unique to your group. 
 
Your Endowment is:   80 
Your cost per unit is:   10 
Payoffs 
 
The Auctioneer has a stack of 20 cards, including  
“Ace, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10” (“Ace” has a value of one.) 
Six cards will be randomly selected in each period. In each period, you will be allowed to 
bid for cards. There are two possible outcomes. 
 
I) You do not buy a card in a period. Your endowment disappears and your 
earnings are zero. 
II) You buy a card. Your earnings are calculated as shown below.  
 
Note: YOU MAY ONLY BUY ONE CARD IN EACH PERIOD. 
 
Example 
 
Suppose you buy a card with the card value “6” at a price of 10. Then your earnings will 
be calculated by: Endowment – Auction Price – (Card Value x Cost per Unit). 
 
Practice this below (fill in the values): 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 80 6 10 10   
  
 
The correct solution is: 80 – 10 – (6 x 10) = 80 – 10 – 60 = 10 
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Earnings Record Sheet – Group A 
 
Your Name:         
 
 
Session 1 
  
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 80   10   
2 80   10   
3 80   10   
 
 
Session 2 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 80   10   
2 80   10   
3 80   10   
 
 
Session 3 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 80   5   
2 80   5   
3 80   5   
 
 
Note: 
If you do not purchase a card, then your earnings for that period are automatically $0. 
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You are in Group B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is an experiment in economic decision-making. You are going to be asked to make 
choices. Your choices will determine your pay-offs in this game. 
 
There are two groups of buyers in this game; those in Group A and those in Group B. 
Your Endowment and Cost are unique to your group. 
 
Your Endowment is:   120 
Your cost per unit is:     20 
Payoffs 
 
The Auctioneer has a stack of 20 cards, including  
“Ace, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10” (“Ace” has a value of one.) 
Six cards will be randomly selected in each period. In each period, you will be allowed to 
bid for cards. There are two possible outcomes. 
 
III) You do not buy a card in a period. Your endowment disappears and your 
earnings are zero. 
IV) You buy a card. Your earnings are calculated as shown below.  
 
Note: YOU MAY ONLY BUY ONE CARD IN EACH PERIOD. 
 
Example 
 
Suppose you buy a card with the card value “3” at a price of 40. Then your earnings will 
be calculated by: Endowment – Auction Price – (Card Value x Cost per Unit). 
 
Practice this below (fill in the values): 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost Per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 120 3 40 20   
  
 
The correct solution is: 120 – 40 – (3 x 20) = 120 – 40 – 60 = 20 
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Earnings Record Sheet – Group B 
 
Your Name:         
 
 
Session 1 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 120   20   
2 120   20   
3 120   20   
 
 
 
Session 2 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Extra 
B-fee 
Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 120   20 20   
2 120   20 20   
3 120   20 20   
 
 
 
Session 3 
 
Period Endowment Card Bought Auction 
Price 
Cost per Unit Total 
Cost 
Earnings 
1 120   20   
2 120   20   
3 120   20   
 
 
Note: 
If you do not purchase a card, then your earnings for that period are automatically $0. 
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FIGURE 1.  Plot of the bid-rent functions for two groups. 
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FIGURE 2.  Experimental outcomes under the no fee (baseline) treatment. 
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FIGURE 3.  Experimental outcomes under the treatment with a fee. 
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FIGURE 4.  Experimental outcomes under a lower per unit price for group A. 
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Table 1.  Sample Record Sheet for Group B Subjects. 
 
Period 
 
Endowment 
Card 
Bought 
Auction 
Price 
Cost 
per Unit
Total 
Cost 
 
Earnings 
1 120 4 20 20 100 20 
2 120   20   
3 120   20   
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Table 2.  Sample Earnings Sheet for Group B Subjects with a Fee. 
 
 
  
 
Period 
 
Endowment 
Card 
Bought 
Auction 
Price 
Cost 
per Unit
Extra 
B-fee 
Total 
Cost 
 
Earnings 
1 120 4 20 20 20 120 0 
2 120   20 20   
3 120   20 20   
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Table 3.  Sample endowments and transportation costs for two groups. 
 
 Endowment Transportation Cost 
Group A 120 20 
Group B 80 10 
 
 
 
 
